HERMAN CAPPELEN PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT INTUITIONS PDF

The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about n The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively or even a little bit on intuitions as evidence. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: It has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.

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This item is printed to order. Items which are printed to order are normally despatched and charged within days. Oxford Scholarship Online. Available in Oxford Scholarship Online - view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers.

No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them.

The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively or even a little bit on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.

He works in philosophy of language, philosophical methodology and related areas of epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind.

Whether one is convinced by its conclusion or not, Philosophy Without Intutions represents a clear jolt to contemporary metaphilosophical orthodoxy. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it.

Even if you're not particularl concerned by this metaphilosophical issue youwould probably still benefit from reading this book, for it may well convince you to change theway in which you articulate your arguments and interpret other authors. Cappelen has made anexcellent contribution to the ongoing debate over the importance of intuitions in philosophy.

In his new book, Herman Cappelen argues that this entire debate is misguided. The reason is simple: philosophers dont rely on intuitions, so there is no reason for philosophers to worry about their reliability. Cappelens case for this claim amounts to one of the most original and well-argued contributions to recent discussions about philosophical methodology. His book should be essential reading for anyone interested in the debate.

It's important because it indirectly but effectively draws attention to some challenging questions that it would be very good for meta-philosophy to get clearer on.

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Ebook This title is available as an ebook. To purchase, visit your preferred ebook provider. Oxford Scholarship Online Available in Oxford Scholarship Online - view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen An incisive and controversial exploration of the role of intuition in philosophy Offers a fresh view of how philosophy works Will galvanize debate about philosophical method Throws down a challenge to the growing 'experimental philosophy' movement.

Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen. Also of Interest. Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind Jaegwon Kim. Things Stephen Yablo. Possibility Michael Jubien. Fixing Language Herman Cappelen. Making Sense of the World Stephen R. Knowing Emotions Rick Anthony Furtak. Exploring Inductive Risk Kevin C.

Elliott, Ted Richards. Confusion of Tongues Stephen Finlay. Understanding Scientific Understanding Henk W. The Exchange of Words Richard Moran. Reflections on the Liar Bradley Armour-Garb.

Education's Epistemology Harvey Siegel.

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I'm glad that Cappelen wrote this book. It's an uneven read, but an important contribution. It's important because it indirectly but effectively draws attention to some challenging questions that it would be very good for meta-philosophy to get clearer on -- questions about the initial demarcation of its subject matter. In particular: of the subtopic that's sometimes called philosophers' 'reliance on intuitions as evidence'. But it would seem important that we do so, or at least, that we do our best in this regard even if our best in the end simply consists in pointing to a bunch of examples. We -- relevant meta-philosophers -- need to somehow home in on the phenomenon to be explored, with enough precision to begin exploring it, but without prejudging any of the hard theoretical questions that our exploration aims to shed light on. How to do that?

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Philosophy without Intuitions

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