We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to improve them. Register your interest. Intransitive preferences have been a topic of curiosity, study, and debate over the past 40 years. Many economists and decision theorists insist on transitivity as the cornerstone of rational choice, and even in behavioral decision theory intransitivities are often attributed to faulty experiments, random or sloppy choices, poor judgment, or unexamined biases. But others see intransitive preferences as potential truths of reasoned comparisons and propose representations of preferences that accommodate intransitivities. This article offers a partial survey of models for intransitive preferences in a variety of decisional contexts.
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We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to improve them. Register your interest. Intransitive preferences have been a topic of curiosity, study, and debate over the past 40 years.
Many economists and decision theorists insist on transitivity as the cornerstone of rational choice, and even in behavioral decision theory intransitivities are often attributed to faulty experiments, random or sloppy choices, poor judgment, or unexamined biases. But others see intransitive preferences as potential truths of reasoned comparisons and propose representations of preferences that accommodate intransitivities.
This article offers a partial survey of models for intransitive preferences in a variety of decisional contexts. These include economic consumer theory, multiattribute utility theory, game theory, preference between time streams, and decision making under risk and uncertainty.
The survey is preceded by a discussion of issues that bear on the relevance and reasonableness of intransitivity. This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access. Rent this article via DeepDyve. Allais, Maurice. XL, Paris, — Google Scholar. Allais and O. Hagen eds. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, pp.
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Intransitivity of preferences
Transitivity of preferences is a fundamental principle shared by most major contemporary rational, prescriptive, and descriptive models of decision making. To have transitive preferences, a person, group, or society that prefers choice option x to y and y to z must prefer x to z. Any claim of empirical violations of transitivity by individual decision makers requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. We discuss why unambiguous evidence is currently lacking and how to clarify the issue. In counterpoint to Tversky's seminal "Intransitivity of Preferences," we reconsider his data as well as those from more than 20 other studies of intransitive human or animal decision makers. We challenge the standard operationalizations of transitive preferences and discuss pervasive methodological problems in the collection, modeling, and analysis of relevant empirical data.
Nontransitive preferences in decision theory
Transitivity of preference is defined as follows: if a person, group or society prefers choice option A to B and they prefer B to C then, in order to be transitive, they must prefer A to C. This colloquium will discuss methodological concerns about past research on preference in transitivity in individual decision makers. The Condorcet paradox shows that transitive individuals may violate weak stochastic transitivity at the level of aggregated data. The talk explores the alternative route of generalized mixture models, in which the sample space of permissible latent preference states is a family of transitive binary relations e. Choice data are modeled as being governed by a probability distribution over such a sample space. This leads to the study of certain convex polytopes, such as, e. The most famous empirical work on intransitivity of individual decision makers' preference is a seminal paper by Tversky , Psychological Review in which some respondents apparently violated weak stochastic transitivity.
Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences
Transitivity of Preferences