The book draws, motivates, and sketches an analysis of these concepts in terms of oughts, which in turn are explained through expressivism. Devices from metaethics thus inform philosophy of language. The oughts are primitive and subjective. Central devices for the project are drawn from Horwich but are taken normative; these include treating meaning through deflation and synonymy.
|Published (Last):||16 July 2005|
|PDF File Size:||4.40 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||8.68 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
The book draws, motivates, and sketches an analysis of these concepts in terms of oughts, which in turn are explained through expressivism. Devices from metaethics thus inform philosophy of language. The oughts are primitive and subjective. Central devices for the project are drawn from Horwich but are taken normative; these include treating meaning through deflation and synonymy. Conceptual truth for thoughts and analyticity for sentences voicing thoughts are explained as specially invariant normative features, and the treatment is internalistic, invoking the credence one should have given total evidence.
Talk of analyticity is initially provisional, with a gloss developed in terms of the ensuing metatheory of meaning. Tests for this metatheory are then devised in terms of the metatheory itself. Expressivism has two prongs: an oblique substantive theory of meanings of normative terms, and a normative rendering of what this substantive theory is claiming. Strongest forms of expressivism and nonnaturalism converge in their theses, but not in their explanations. Keywords: meaning , mental content , normative , expressivism , metaethics , philosophy of language , synonymy , analyticity , metatheory of meaning , reference.
Forgot password? Don't have an account? All Rights Reserved. OSO version 0. University Press Scholarship Online. Sign in. Not registered? Sign up. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication. Print Email Share This. Show Summary Details. Subscriber Login Email Address. Password Please enter your Password. Library Card Please enter your library card number. View: no detail some detail full detail.
All rights reserved. Powered by: Safari Books Online.
Meaning and Normativity
As a global organisation, we, like many others, recognize the significant threat posed by the coronavirus. During this time, we have made some of our learning resources freely accessible. Our distribution centres are open and orders can be placed online. Do be advised that shipments may be delayed due to extra safety precautions implemented at our centres and delays with local shipping carriers. Oxford Scholarship Online. Available in Oxford Scholarship Online - view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.
Gibbard's book represents the most ambitious and innovative attempt to explain meaning since Paul Horwich and Robert Brandom developed their theories in the nineties. The first half offers richly detailed accounts of word meaning, analyticity, synonymy, reference, truth, and truth conditions, and the second half focuses on normative expressions, updating and extending Gibbard's celebrated expressivist account of the meanings of those terms, and integrating the account with the general theory of meaning that is developed in earlier chapters. In addition to these primary concerns, the book proposes a solution to the Kripkenstein paradox, presents a theory of the norms linking truth to belief, explores the relationships between expressivism and naturalism, argues for a set of views about the connection between believing propositions and accepting sentences, develops a story of the individuation of the objects of belief and thought, and responds to Mark Schroeder's critique of expressivism. It comments in passing on a variety of other topics, almost always in an illuminating way.